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HUSBAND'S ACQUISITION OF TITLE WITH FUNDS
FURNISHED BY WIFE: RESULTING
TRUST OR PRESUMPTION OF GIFT
The acquisition of title to property' by a husband, utilizing
funds supplied 2 by his wife, is generally held to create a resulting
trust in the wife's favor. This result is illogical when viewed in
light of two presently existing presumptions. Generally a result-
ing trust is declared in favor of the person paying the purchase
price of property transferred to another unless there is evidence
that the payor intended that no resulting trust should arise.3 How-
ever, whenever the transferee is a wife, child or other natural object
of the bounty of the payor of the purchase price, a resulting trust
does not arise unless the transferor manifests an intention that
such transferee should not have any beneficial interest.4 It would
seem logical that, assuming a husband is a natural object of a
wife's bounty, a gift should be presumed unless the wife mani-
fests a contrary intention. Nevertheless, while agreement is
clearly lacking, the general rule is stated to the contrary: in the
absence of any contrary manifested intention by the wife-payor, a
trust results in the wife's favor.5
1. Since the material discussed does not distinguish the difference,
the doctrine applies alike to personalty as well as to realty. Bacon v.
Grosse, 165 Cal. 481, 132 P. 1027 (1913) (stocks and bonds); Barker v.
Montana Gold Min. Co., 35 Mont. 351, 89 P. 66 (1907) (stock); Monahan v.
Monahan, 77 Vt. 133, 59 A. 169 (1904) (deposit in bank); 4 J. POMEROY,
POMEROY'S EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1038 (5th ed. 1941).
2. To raise the resulting trust, the funds must be provided or the
obligation assumed prior to or at the time of purchase. Subsequent pay-
ment or assumption will not be sufficient to raise the resulting trust in the
payor's favor. Curielli v. Curielli, 388 Ill. 215, 57 N.E.2d 879 (1944); Moat
v. Moat, 301 Mass. 469, 17 N.E.2d 710 (1938); Peel v. Peel, 303 Pa. 397, 154
A. 813 (1913); Rehm v. Rehm, 32 Pa. D. & C. 193 (C.P. Phila. 1938); 5 A.
SCOTT, ScoT oN TRUSTS § 457 (3d ed. 1967).
3. G. BOCERT, TRUST AND TRUSTEES, § 454 (2d ed. 1964); 4 J. PomE-
ROY, POMEROY'S EQuiTY JURISPRUDENCE, § 1037 (5th ed. 1941); 4 R. POWELL,
REAL PROPERTY 592 (1968); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 404 (1959).
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, § 442-43 (1959).
5. Keaton v. Pipkins, 43 F.2d 497 (10th Cir. 1930); Thornton v.
Rodgers, 251 Ala. 553, 38 So. 2d 479 (1949); Gilbert v. Gilbert, 180 Ark.
596, 22 S.W.2d 32 (1929); Zeller v. Knapp, 135 Cal. App. 122, 26 P.2d 704
(1933); Williams v. Williams, 147 Fla. 419, 2 So.2 d 725 (1941); Crawford v.
Hurst, 299 Ill. 503, 132 N.E. 521 (1921); Sheffield Mining Co. v. Hertzman,
192 Iowa 1288, 184 N.W. 631 (1922); Glover v. Waltham Laundry Co., 235
Mass. 330, 127 N.E. 420 (1920); Ryals v. Douglas, 205 Miss. 695, 39 So. 2d
311 (1949); In re Yasilonis' Estate, 204 Misc. 755, 125 N.Y.S.2d 363 (Sur.
Ct. 1953); Kelly Springfield Tire Co. v. Lester, 190 N.C. 411, 130 S.E. 45
These presumptions function as a dual edged sword in the
wife's hands. Whenever the wife furnishes the consideration and
the spouse takes title, assuming no contrary manifested intention,
she obtains the benefit of the presumption of a resulting trust
(wife-payor-trust); moreover, when the husband furnishes the
consideration, and the spouse takes title, she obtains the additional
benefit of a presumption of a gift in her favor (husband-payor-gift).
The trite general rule applies: "heads she wins, tails he loses." The
dichotomy created by these contrary presumptions presents collat-
eral issues concerning both the logic and effect of these presump-
tions. This Comment will evaluate the present resulting trust-pre-
sumption of a gift dichotomy on the basis of these collateral issues
and suggest reliance on a rule which not only would add symmetry
and logic to the law but also reduce inequitable effects of the pres-
ent general rule when third parties are involved.
BACKGROUND
Generally, payment of purchase money by one not taking title
gives rise to a resulting trust in favor of the payor or the one who
furnishes the consideration in absence of a contrary intention
manifested by him.0 Courts of equity infer that the transferee is
to hold naked legal title and not any beneficial interest.7 The
principle establishing this inference is clear. Since a person does
not normally extend gifts to strangers, the transfer of funds to such
a stranger permits the inference to be drawn that the transferor did
not intend to transfer any beneficial interest. This inference of a
retained beneficial interest is what causes the trust to result back
to the payor. Intention is an integral part of a resulting trust, and
an inference of this intention arises from the mere transfer to the
stranger.8 Therefore, the power of equity will act to protect the
interest of the person from whom the consideration comes, or who
represents or is identified in right with the consideration when the
purpose of the conveyance has been frustratedY
(1925); Rhodes v. Peery, 142 Ore. 165, 19 P.2d 418 (1933); Hofteizer v.
Prange, 45 S.D. 228, 186 N.W. 963 (1922); Peman v. Blount, 264 S.W. 169
(Tex. Civ. App. 1924); cf. Schwarz v. United States, 191 F.2d 618 (4th Cir.
1951) (where wife paid for land and title was taken in both names, there
was a resulting trust in her favor for the entire property); Light v.
Zeller, 144 Pa. 570, 22 A. 1029 (1891) (held a resulting trust existed but
the value of the holding may be distinguished since there was an obvious
agreement between the husband and wife).
6. See authority cited note 3 supra.
7. 4 J. POMEROY, POMEROY's EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1037 (5th ed.
1941).
8. Cf. 4 J. POMEROY, POMEROY's EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1031 n.5
(5th ed. 1941) (constructive trust is imposed not because of intention of
parties but because person holding title to property would profit by a
wrong or would be unjustly enriched); 5 A. SCOTT, SCOTT ON TRUSTS § 404.2
(3d ed. 1967) (the constructive trust arises without any obvious intention
to create a trust such as when a transferee derives property through
fraud, duress, or undue influence).
9. The underlying principle to all implied trusts is consideration
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Conversely, one is presumed to make gifts to those who are the
objects of his natural bounty or are entitled to support. While
the wife or child do not generally have a duty to support at common
law, there have been gradual statutory inroads establishing a
limited duty to support.10 The duty of support imposed upon a
wife or child may not rise to the same degree but it would seem
that the husband is no less the object of their natural bounty,,1 as
they are his. This alone should be enough to support the pre-
sumption of a gift.
A MORE LOGICAL VIEW
Before alternatives can be suggested, assessment of both the
reasoning and the circumstances behind the present presumptions
is imperative. As Professor Scott so aptly phrases the query:
What, then is the guiding principle which is applied by
the courts in determining what relationships raise an in-
ference of an intention by the payor to make a gift, and
what relationships raise an inference of an intention to
make the grantee a trustee for the payor?
2
Some courts premise their presumption of a gift on the payor's
duty to support. 13 The rule, clearly enunciated by these courts,
is that where a man pays for property and it is conveyed to his wife
or child, the presumption arises that the transfer was intended to
be a gift or advancement. 14 The dominant reason assigned for the
adoption of the rule was that there is a legal obligation resting
upon the father to support such wife or child.' 5 Conversely, how-
ever, when the wife furnishes the purchase money and the deed is
taken in the husband's name the rule has not been favored.' 6 This
and the equitable doctrine concerning it. In short, consideration draws
to it the equitable right to the property. See 3 J. POMEROY, POMEROY'S
EQuITY JURISPRUDENCE § 981 (5th ed. 1941).
10. MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 36-101 (1961); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 44:1-
140 (Supp. 1969); N.Y. GEN. OBLIGATIONS LAW § 5-311 (McKinney 1964);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 1973 (1968). The majority of statutes provide
that the wife or other relative is liable to support the spouse in order to
prevent him from becoming a public charge.
11. For a discussion of principles of "natural bounty" theory, see
note 23 infra.
12. 4 A. SCOTT, ScoTT ON TRusTs, § 442 (2d ed. 1956).
13. Hill v. Hopkins, 198 Ark. 1049, 133 S.W.2d 634 (1940); Lutyens v.
Aldrich, 308 Ill. 11, 139 N.E. 50 (1923); Crawford v. Hurst, 299 Ill. 503, 132
N.E. 521 (1921); Wright v. Wright, 242 Ill. 71, 89 N.E. 789 (1909); Rhodes
v. Peery, 142 Ore. 165, 19 P.2d 418 (1933).
14. E.g., Lutyens v. Aldrich, 308 Ill. 11, 13, 139 N.E. 50, 52 (1923);
Rhodes v. Peery, 142 Ore. 165, 168, 19 P.2d 418, 421 (1933).
15. Cases cited note 14 supra.
16. Cases cited note 5 supra.
rule seems natural, if there is never a support duty imposed upon
wife or child, but considering that there are statutory inroads upon
this situation and that there are occasions when the husband no
longer has a duty to support, it proves to be an over-generaliza-
tion.
17
The Montana Supreme Court in Bingham v. National Bank,'8
critized the "support theory," by-passed the distinguishing charac-
teristics of support, and stated that, while the wife has no absolute
duty to support, in certain instances she is bound to contribute to
support the husband or family. While the mutual duty to support
has shifted nearer, the distinctions in duty owed cannot alone
justify the rejection of the theory. However, if the support theory
is sound, it would seem to follow that whenever a parent provides
the consideration and an adult child takes title, a gift would not
be presumed because there is no longer a duty to support. Un-
fortunately, this has not been the case and a gift has been presumed
where the parent provides consideration for such an emancipated
child.19 To presume a gift, in the absence of such duty, seems to
indicate that perhaps, the "support theory" is not the guiding princi-
ple, needless to say the proper one.
Holding that the evidence sustained the finding that there was
a resulting trust, the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Weisberg v.
Koprowski20 discussed all theories: (1) support, (2) closeness of
relation, and (3) natural bounty. Finding that the "support
theory" could not be the principle on which courts have relied, the
New Jersey court stated that the inference of a gift is not to be de-
termined by any legal obligation to furnish support.2 ' Without
discussion, the court dismissed "closeness of relation" 22 as being the
underlying principle and suggested that the modern view of "natu-
ral bounty" 23 would be more satisfactory.
17. Compare Huffman v. Huffman, 311 Pa. 123, 166 A. 570 (1933)
(husband legally obligated to support his wife); Commonwealth ex rel.
Shaffer v. Shaffer, 175 Pa. Super. 100, 103 A.2d 430 (1954) (obligation arises
from the marital status imposed by law) with authorities cited note 10
supra. See also cases cited note 19 infra.
18. 105 Mont. 159, 72 P.2d 90 (1937); see authority cited note 10 supra.
19. E.g., First National Bank v. Honstein, 144 Colo. 176, 355 P.2d 535
(1960); Moore v. Moore, 9 Ill. 2d 556, 138 N.E.2d 562 (1956); In re King's
Estate, 49 Wyo. 453, 57 P.2d 675 (1936).
20. 17 N.J. 362, 111 A.2d 481 (1955).
21. Id. at 368, 111 A.2d at 486; 5 A. ScowT, ScoTT ON TarusTs, § 442
(3d ed. 1967).
22. Simply stated the theory would presume a gift when the trans-
feree was within a certain delineated group of the family. While it would
be arbitrary in application, questions as to who is a member of the family
could lead to incongruities in the development.
23. The "natural object of bounty" theory seems to be resorted to
when avenues for presumption of a gift on other theories are closed. See
Weisberg v. Koprowski, 17 N.J. 362, 111 A.2d 481 (1955) (since adult child
did not have general duty to support the mother, court suggested that,
were it not for other evidence, the relationship between the married son
and aged mother was such as to infer a gift as a natural object of his
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The "closeness of relation" theory, as a basis for the existing
rule, also seems to result in less than salutary ends. The difficulty
in developing this arbitrary theory is evidenced by the following
reflection on the alterations of family roles:
The earlier decisions in England were based upon a social
system which has been tending to disappear. . . . [T]he
central figure was the husband and father . . . surrounded
by dependent wife and children. . . . It was natural for
him to make gifts to his wife and children, but quite un-
natural to expect ... gifts to him.
2 4
Since the wife could not make gifts until the creation of woman's
separate estate, the duty was not incumbent upon her to provide
for her children.25 Woman's new function in society, enhanced by
her capability of holding and transferring all property whether
real or personal, makes the distinction tenuous today.
26
In Bingham v. National Bank,27 the court noted that in most
instances the wife-payor-trust rule had been adopted prior to the
"Married Women's Acts"28 and criticized the "closeness of relation"
theory underlying the rule as well as the rule itself. The former
formidable reasons-her inferior economic status, and inability in
taking, holding and managing property-valid prior to the enact-
ment of her new rights, are no longer persuasive.2 9 More recently,
in Fergusen v. Stokes30 the Missouri Supreme Court stated the wife-
payor-trust and the husband-payor-gift are rendered purely arbi-
trary contrary presumptions with the passage of the Married
bounty). The theory places the burden on the transferee desiring the pre-
sumption of a gift to show by certain evidence that he is a natural object
of bounty; the presumption does not arise arbitrarily.
24. 5 A. SCOTT, SCOTT ON TRUSTS § 442 (3d ed. 1967).
25. Id.
26. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 90-2-1 et seq. (1964); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 68, § 1 et seq. (Smith-Hurd 1959); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:2-12, 2-16
(1968); N.Y. GEN. OBLIGATIONS § 3-301 (McKinney 1964); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 48, § 32.1 (1965) (generally the wife is given the same power and rights
as husband in relation to property).
27. 105 Mont. 159, 72 P.2d 90 (1937).
28. The Acts basically provide that:
Hereafter, a married woman shall have the same right and power
as a married man to acquire, own, possess, control, use, convey,
lease or mortgage any property of any kind, real, personal, or
mixed, either in possession or in expectancy, or to make any con-
tract in writing or otherwise, and may exercise the same right and
power in the same manner and to the same extent as a married
man.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 32.1 (1965).
29. Bingham v. National Bank, 105 Mont. 159, 72 P.2d 90 (1937);
G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, BOGERT ON TRUSTS & TRUSTEES, § 460 (2d ed.
1964). See 24 COL. L.R. 325; 37 HARv. L. REv. 921.
30. 269 S.W.2d 655 (Mo. 1954).
Women's Acts and the present position of married women in all
financial, business, and professional areas.
It appears that the "support theory" is not factually correct
and that the "closeness of relationship" theory is based upon an
inferior female status which no longer exists in the United States.
To advocate a rule providing that, if the wife pays and the husband
takes title, a trust results in her favor while the converse results
in a gift is, therefore, anachronistic and deplete of support on either
of these two theories. To presume a gift in both situations would
clarify the matter even if the theory would be somewhat arbitrary.
The modern view prefers to base determination upon whether
the grantee is a "natural obect of bounty" of the payor or whether
he stands in such relationship that is probable that the payor
intended a gift to him."- The natural object theory goes beyond the
arbitrary bounds of the hard and fast rules in the search for the
essential ingredient of intent and looks to the circumstances of the
parties at the time of the acquisition. While proximity cannot be
the sole guideline, it does not necessarily preclude the fact that
utilization of family relationship may be one practical considera-
tion.. 2 Likewise, the duty to support would be a proper considera-
tion under the "natural object" theory. However, neither the re-
lationship nor the support duty would be binding and would only
be elements of total circumstances.
EFFECTS OF PRESUMPTIONS
A presumption, wherever applicable, merely serves to erect
a prima facie case for the party in whose favor it exists. Neither
the presumption of a resulting trust nor the presumption of a gift
is compelled merely because the proofs suffice to raise one or the
other.3 3 Generally, presumptions are not to be accorded excessive
weight requiring one or the other conclusion since intention is the
controlling feature. The presumption may be rebutted or over-
come by prior or contemporaneous evidence accompanying the
transaction and corroborated by any subsequent conduct of the
parties.
34
It is generally agreed that the peculiar effect of a presumption
of law, that is a real presumption, is merely to invoke a rule of law
compelling the jury to reach a particular conclusion in the absence
31. 5 A. ScoTT, ScoTT ON TRUSTS, § 442 (3d ed. 1967); see Weisberg v.
Koprowski, 17 N.J. 362, 111 A.2d 481 (1955).
32. See Jacobsen v. Farnharm, 155 Neb. 776, 53 N.W.2d 917 (1952)
(where the relationships of the parties are sufficiently close, it would give
rise to the presumption of a gift; and where the parties are husband and
wife, there is a presumption that the placing of title in the name of the
other was an intended gift).
33. Weisberg v. Koprowski, 17 N.J. 362, 111 A.2d 481 (1955).
34. Killen v. Killen, 141 N.J. Eq. 312, 57 A.2d 33 (1948).
Comments
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
of contrary evidence from the opponent 6 Presumptions, in them-
selves, are not evidence but merely control the direction from which
evidence must come. In Flower v. Scott,36 the function of pre-
sumptions was indicated as follows:
Thus, such presumptions are beacons designed to regulate
the course of inquiry in quest of the real intention of the
party. They do not prevent the court from discovering the
real intentions of the party outside the channel.
The fundamental distinction between a presumption and an in-
ference is that the former shifts the burden of going forward while
the latter merely suggests a result which can be accepted or rejected
by the jury.
37
In the case where a wife has provided funds for property which
the husband purchased, the proceeding begins with the wife-payor
having the burden of proving the resulting trust.38 Yet, with the
aid of the presumptions, the burden of going forward shifts.3 9 The
natural query which follows would be to what extent must the
husband-transferee, or whoever holds his interest, go forward with
evidence to rebut the presumption arising in the spouse's favor.
Although the presumptions of a gift or trust arise from similar
circumstances, the proof necessary for rebuttal is somewhat in-
congruous on a cursory review. The mere evidence of a lack of
knowledge or consent was held to be sufficient to rebut a presump-
tion of a gift. 40 However, the prevailing authorities agree that the
gift can only be rebutted by clear, unequivocal, and convincing
evidence.4 1 If a gift were presumed when the wife paid the pur-
chase price, she would not only have the burden of proof to estab-
35. Watkins v. Prudential Ins. Co., 315 Pa. 497, 501, 173 A. 644, 648
(1934).
36. 8 N.J. Super. 490, 492, 73 A.2d 278, 280 (1950).
37. Bower v. Bower, 78 N.J.L. 387, 74 A. 522 (1909).
38. Adams v. Griffin, 253 Ala. 371, 45 So. 2d 22 (1949); Newbein v.
Farris, 149 Okla. 74, 299 P. 192 (1931); Parker v. Newitt, 18 Ore. 274, 23 P.
246 (1890); Brown v. Halfen, 294 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
39. In a situation where the wife is the payor and the husband takes
title, the wife has the burden of proving the trust; but, under the majority
view, the wife is aided by the presumptive force which shifts the burden of
going forward. It is conceivable that, by merely showing the circum-
stances sufficient to allow a trust to arise in her favor, a wife may be in
such a position that a jury will be compelled to find in her favor. E.g.,
Wallace v. Kilbride, 319 F.2d 760 (3d Cir. 1963).
40. Crespo v. Crespo, 54 W. Va. 581, 46 S.E. 582 (1904).
41. Blaine v. Blaine, 63 Ariz. 100, 159 P.2d 786 (1945); Houdek v.
Ehrenberger, 397 Ill. 62, 72 N.E.2d 837 (1947); Mountford v. Mountford, 181
Md. 212, 29 A.2d 259 (1942); Hermanoski v. Hermanoski, 18 N.J. Super. 406,
87 A.2d 452 (1952); Katz v. Katz, 121 N.Y.S.2d 562 (Sup. Ct. 1953); Dun-
ning v. Dunning, Pa. D. & C. 468, 30 Del. 361 (C.P. Del. 1941).
lish a trust but also the burden of going forward with the evidence.
But under the general rule, a trust is presumed in favor of the wife
and the burden of going forward is on the husband to rebut the
presumption of the trust which the payor has the burden of prov-
ing.42 The true effects of the presumptions are not necessarily
confined to the husband-wife sector. When those beyond the im-
mediate interfamily circle enter the picture, the weight of the
presumption can become obviously more unfair.
APPLICATION OF PRESUMPTIONS: RELATION OF TIME AND PARTIES
To think of the presumptions limited to the mere family orbit,
is to avoid the broader effects of the rule discussed. Even though
the rule has been systematically extended, the effects have been
less than salutary. Foremost, the rights of creditors vis-a-vis the
record owner husband (wife-payor-trust) are, it seems, jeopardized
by a rule allowing a wife to come forward asserting a resulting
trust. Although the wife has the burden of proving the trust, it
seems very burdensome to require a third party to prove the wife's
intention to make a gift to her husband in order to rebut the trust
presumed in her favor.43 The situation would certainly lend itself
to collusion, where it would be fruitless to expect any favorable
extraction of parol evidence from either the husband or the wife.
In Wallace v. Kilbride,44 the creditors of the husband sought to
assert their rights vis-a-vis the husband. Prior to the suit, the
husband transferred a one-half record interest in property to his
spouse.45 The court stated that the general rule applies where the
wife pays the purchase price and the property is transferred to the
husband and a resulting trust arises in favor of the wife unless a
contrary intention is manifested. 46 The uncontradicted testimony
suggested that the wife paid the entire purchase price; however,
the testimony was uncertain whether the inclusion of the husband's
42. Some factors rebutting the establishment of a trust are: (1) that
the grantee is related to the payor, (2) that the payor is wealthy and the
grantee is poor, (3) that the grantee has maintained control over the
property, and (4) that no reason can be asserted for taking title in name
of the grantee. 5 A. Scorr, ScoTT ON TRusTS, § 441 (3d ed. 1967).
43. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 601 (1955), provides that a resulting
trust with respect to real property caused by supplying the purchase money
is void as to bona fide judgment and other creditors unless (1) a declara-
tion of trust is filed and recorded in the county of the situs, or (2) unless
an action of ejectment is brought in the proper county by the person ad-
vancing the funds.
44. 319 F.2d 760 (3d Cir. 1963) (applying Virgin Island law).
45. Id. at 762.
46. Id. at 763; see, e.g., Schwarz v. United States, 191 F.2d 618 (4th
Cir. 1951); Keaton v. Pipkins, 43 F.2d 497 (10th Cir. 1930); Wright v.
Wright, 242 Ill. 71, 89 N.E. 789 (1909); Kelly Springfield Tire Co. v. Lester,
190 N.C. 411, 130 S.E. 45 (1925); cf. Dixon v. Dixon, 123 Md. 44, 90 A. 846
(1914); Graham v. Onderdunk, 33 N.J. 356, 164 A.2d 749 (1960); Rayher v.
Rayher, 14 N.J. 174, 101 A.2d 524 (1953); 5 A. ScoTT, SCOTT ON TRUSTS,
§ 442 (3d ed. 1967).
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name on the title was by design or mistake-no finding was made.
47
Mrs. Kilbride, with the presumption of a resulting trust in her
favor, had the burden of proving the resulting trust. The court,
evaluating the circumstances stated:
As we have seen, the entire purchase price . .. was paid
by Mrs. Kilbride out of her own personal funds. More-
over . . . there was no finding . . . that Mrs. Kilbride di-
rected that Kilbride's name be included as transferee ...
for the purpose of making a gift to him .... Indeed there
is no evidence from which such a finding could be made
under the circumstances it must be concluded that a trust
. . . resulted .... 48
In evaluating the case, it is apparent that the wife or husband
and wife did little more than show the source of the consideration
utilized to purchase the property. The creditors were shackled
with the burden of going forward with enough evidence to show
that the wife manifested a contrary intention. The resultant force
of the presumption was very strong, strong enough to result in a
finding of a trust in the wife's favor. Conceivably, a case might
arise where a wife provides funds and title is taken by the husband
(wife-payor-trust); he would be estopped from asserting a result-
ing trust in his wife's favor when credit had been availed him on the
basis of the apparent ownership.
49
Perhaps it would be more expedient to utilize a rule of proof
production based upon the comparative availability of material
evidence to the respective parties.50 Since a conclusion based upon
generally known results of wide human experience places a burden
on third parties,5 1 it clearly seems more expedient for a wife or
those who hold her interest to be required to produce evidence
concerning her intent when she transfers funds to her spouse and
he acquires title. More succinctly stated, presume the gift to the
spouse thereby placing the burden upon the party who has access
to the proof of intent to create a trust.
5 2
The extent of time available within which one can assert the
resulting trust is also an important question. In Lloyd v. Woods"3
47. Wallace v. Kilbride, 319 F.2d 760, 763 (3d Cir. 1963).
48. Id.
49. See In re Carpenter, 179 F. 743 (D.C.S.C. 1910).
50. Watkins v. Prudential Ins. Co., 315 Pa. 497, 504, 173 A. 644, 648
:1934).
51. Id.; see notes 2-3 and accompanying text supra.
52. E.g., White v. Amenta, 110 Conn. 314, 148 A. 345 (1930); Bing-
ham v. National Bank, 105 Mont. 159, 72 P.2d 90 (1937); Petersen v. Massey,
155 Neb. 829, 53 N.W.2d 912 (1952).
53. 176 Pa. 63, 34 A. 926 (1896) (emphasis added).
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated as it had previously held 54
that, if a husband having the money or property of his wife in his
possession invests it in real estate and without her consent thereto
takes title himself, she has a resulting trust in the land which she
can assert at any time she sees proper to enforce it, to the extent
the property was paid for with her money. However, the court did
not refer to a previous decision" where it had held that, to establish
a resulting trust which is to overturn a record title of nearly thirty
years, it must appear by clear proof that her money went into the
property at the inception, 6 that the purchase was made by her,
or for her account, and that the placing of the title in her husband
was a violation of an agreement by which the deed was made to
her.
This latter holding would seem to require the rights to be
asserted in due time or be diminished or barred by the equitable
doctrine of laches. In fact, the requirements as enunciated by
Crawford v. Thompson 57 appears to be a complete reversal of the
effects of the presumption of a resulting trust in favor of the wife,
at least when the record title has been in the husband's name for a
long period of time. The failure to assert the resulting trust over
a period of years would, in effect, obviate the effect of the presump-
tion in the wife's favor. The matter in Pennsylvania is still un-
decided as to whether a resulting trust or a gift arises from a similar
situation when the right is asserted within adequate time.58
CONCLUSION
The presumption of a resulting trust in favor of the wife upon
furnishing of funds prior to purchase by the husband cannot be
solely supported on either the "support" or "closeness of relation"
theories. The time for such distinction between the husband-payor-
gift and wife-payor-trust has elapsed. The anachronistic theory
supports a resultant rule that is excessively burdensome. The
anachronism results from the alteration of woman's status in so-
ciety without a concomitant change in the rule affecting her
54. Light v. Zeller, 144 Pa. 570, 22 A. 1029 (1891).
55. Crawford v. Thompson, 142 Pa. 551, 21 A. 994 (1891); cf. Byers v.
Ferner, 216 Pa. 233, 65 A. 620 (1907) (requiring not only evidence that the
wife was the source from which money was obtained, but that it was in-
vested under some understanding or agreement or that taking of title was
done without her consent or knowledge, such that it would not suffice to
simply say that the husband obtained funds from the wife and made the
purchase to establish a resulting trust after a thirty year lapse of time).
56. See discussion and cases cited note 2 supra.
57. 142 Pa. 551, 21 A. 994 (1891).
58. Rehm v. Rehm, 32 Pa. D. & C. 193 (C.P. Phila. 1938):
[W]hich presumption exists in case the purchase price is paid by
the wife and title is taken in the name of the husband is subject to
some doubt. Pennsylvania cases can be cited on either side but





rights and duties. The excess burden arises whenever persons out-
side the interfamily sector assert their rights vis-a-vis the husband
holding title (wife-payor-trust). The equitable doctrine of laches
may, at times, be asserted to mitigate the burdensome effect. How-
ever, the redeeming values of presuming a gift in like situations
whether a husband-payor or a wife-payor would be to add sym-
metry to the law, to rectify the presently anachronistic theory, and
to shift the burden of going forward with evidence to the party to
whom proof of intent would be most accessible.
Perhaps an even better system would be to give rise to the pre-
sumption only after one party has shown himself or herself to
have been the natural bounty of the person supplying the funds
at the time of acquisition. Such a system would incorporate both
the support and closeness of relationship theories, making them
mere elements of an examination of the totality of circumstances
surrounding the parties.
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